Peak-load pricing has long been seen as a way to internalize externalities and, at the same time, as a set of incentives to shift some peak-hour trips to off-peak periods. The policy has also been viewed as a mechanism to generate revenues. But it is an open question how travelers trade off time for money and respond to peak-off-peak pricing differentials. This generates some timely and related questions, including: 1) How can we model the activity location and traffic implications for multiple time-of-day periods in a major metropolitan area? and 2) What are the network level-of-service and urban development effects of implementing peak-load pricing on selected routes? It is seemingly possible to conduct simulations on actual highway networks to treat these questions, but none of the many existing basic urban models is able to examine the issues of simultaneous route choice and time-of-day choice involving millions of travelers, thousands of traffic network zones, and hundreds of thousands of network links in an equilibrium system. This research addresses these questions by extending the Southern California Planning Model (SCPM) so that it can be used to determine the time-of-day, trip distribution, and network traffic effects of various pricing schemes for the greater Los Angeles (five-county) metropolitan area. The model estimates improvements in levels of services throughout the highway network for various toll charges. It examines how drivers trade off route-choice with time-of-day choice against the option of traveling less. Our approach also estimates the implied revenues by local jurisdiction as well as possible land use effects in terms of altered development pressures throughout the region. The effects for two different toll scenarios are compared and policy implications are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
If price does not ration, something else will. For most U.S. roads and highways, the pricing option has been avoided and rationing by crowding results. The recent estimate by The Texas Transportation Institute in their annual reports of congestion costs is that losses amount to $78 billion per year, or about 40 hours per year per urban traveler (TTI 2009) . Public transit investments have been the preferred policy antidote, but the available evidence shows negligible effect on road and highway congestion (Baum-Snow and Kahn 2005) . The costs of many of these projects can be counted as part of the costs of the policy choice to avoid congestion pricing. The public's reported unhappiness with time spent in slow-moving traffic is apparent in various poll results (Zmud and Arce 2008) . In addition, recent research has shown that most peak-hour travel is for non-work purposes (Lee, et al. 2009) 1 , suggesting that pricing could be an incentive for some of these trips to move to off-peak hours, making peak-hour capacity available. Finally, many local governments report that they are facing revenue shortfalls; improved auto energy efficiency will further diminish their revenues from cents-per-gallon revenues. Revenues from road pricing have an obvious attraction for officials in many jurisdictions.
For all of these reasons, transportation economists have long argued for the efficacy of a road pricing policy. But they have with rare exception not been able to persuade policy makers. In the eyes of many, pricing is "inequitable". But things may be changing. Recent research suggests changing public attitudes 62 percent of all AM-peak (6-9am) person trips were for non-work purposes and 76 percent of the PM-peak (4-7pm) person-trips were for non-work purposes, the corresponding proportions for 2009 were 63 percent and 76 percent. These refer to MondayThursday; the Friday patterns are slightly different.
and South Korea, the U.K. as well as on two freeways in California (Sullivan 2006) . Congestion pricing may be an idea whose time has come.
Another auspicious development involves the possibility of what some have called "smart mobility".
GSM-positioning and GPS-tracking technologies vastly expand the possibilities for traffic monitoring, congestion fee determination, and fast feedback to drivers. Whereas "Fastrak"-type toll collection has been available and implemented for some years, the possibilities for the application of modern telecommunications devices are just beginning to be explored. And with these new possibilities, the congestion pricing options are greater than ever.
Various studies are available to show the effects of peak-load pricing for a few available trials. In response What are the advantages and disadvantages of HOT lanes, cordon pricing, toll roads, pricing on freeways, and their various combinations? Recent experiences in Orange County, for example, suggest many questions remain to be answered. Orange County's initial response to growth pressures might best be characterized as "don't build it and they won't come." Public authorities maintained a deliberate policy of not increasing road capacity, but growth occurred anyway. Faced with a dramatic decrease in network level of service, policy objectives changed. The Orange County Transportation Authority spearheaded interagency efforts to catch up with the demand for transportation by investing in a variety of toll road facilities, among other strategies. Toll road experience has been mixed and these facilities have not delivered the degree of congestion relief hoped for nor predicted by transportation economists.
The planning challenge is that the abstract systemic representation embedded in the standard economic argument in favor of tolls is replaced by a complex physical network in the real world. It is becoming increasingly evident that, as important as pricing mechanisms are likely to become, their impact on levels of service in and the net efficiency of an urban network subject to piecemeal tolling schemes are difficult to predict (Gordon et al., in Richardson and Bae, 2008) . In addition, very little is known about how development pressures at various locations throughout a large metropolitan region would be affected.
This research addressed two timely and related questions. 1) How can we model the traffic and development pressure effects of implementing peak-load pricing on selected routes in a major metropolitan area? and 2) What are the network and development pressure effects of selected pricing choices, as discovered via an application of the model to the Los Angeles metropolitan area?
With respect to possible development effects, consider that some analysts have pinned "excessive urban sprawl" on the absence of road pricing. Indeed, in the simplest monocentric models of cities, low transport costs are linked to lower densities. But even in monocentric models the story becomes more complex when the assumption of a homogeneous population is introduced. Various income groups trade off time for money at distinct rates; how they respond to opportunities to choose between time costs and dollar costs is unique to each. And the availability of these options depends on the peculiarities of the road network in their vicinity -as well as which parts of it are priced and what the prices are. This is why simulations on an actual network are required to address the question. Indeed none of the many extensions of the basic urban model can possibly identify the net result when a complex population of drivers chooses between a set of paths each made up of a variety of links, some of which are priced and some of which are not.
Route-choice and time-of-day choice are compared and system equilibrium is achieved when millions of drivers are indifferent at the margin.
II. THEORTICAL BACKGROUND
Economists' interest in road pricing goes back to the early work of Pigou (1932 ), Walters (1961 ), and Vickrey (1963 Consider also that the standard analysis is often used to make the claim that shadow prices are available by which possible link expansions within any network can be ranked. The largest toll indicates the link that should be expanded first. But this conclusion may not hold if links are part of a network. Any particular link expansion can have unique network effects that would have to be considered in a cost-benefit analysis. The SCPM model relies on the specification of exogenous direct impacts (final demand changes) at specific TAZs which allocates the indirect effects to TAZs or political jurisdictions using weighted employment or freight flow matrix estimated from a freight model and distributes the induced effects using a journey-to-work matrix. Both of these result from a highway network equilibrium.
This introduces the third basic model component, a freight model that estimates the freight flow OD matrix. The freight model separates regional commodity flows to intra-regional and interregional flows. 
SCENARIOS
Our objective was to test the impacts of implementing externality-internalizing tolls using a network model of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Fortunately, a recent paper by Parry and Small (2009) provides estimates of what such tolls should be for Los Angeles. These authors suggest the efficient congestion as well as pollution and accident externality costs (less fuel taxes) for peak as well as off-peak hours. Their two estimated congestion charges are $0.26 per mile and $0.03 per mile. The associated total charges are $0.31 and $0.08, respectively. Our simulations focused on congestion charges only and, rounding the Parry-Small suggestions, we tested scenarios involving $0.30 per mile and $0.10 per mile for the two peak periods only. In these tests, we applied the tolls to all freeway links in both peak periods. The dollars per mile congestion toll fees were converted to hours per mile congestion time based on the hourly wage estimated from the IMPLAN 2001 data. The $0.10 per mile tolls was converted to 0.0057 hr/mile or 0.3407 min/mile while the $0.30 per mile tolls was converted to 0.0170 hr/mile or 1.0220 min/mile. In the modeling described below, the peak hours are defined as 6-am to 9-am in the morning and 3-pm to 7-pm in the evening for the five weekdays. We realize that a large number of alternate policies can be tested and we plan to study these in future work.
IV. MODEL AND ALGORITHM
Various versions of SCPM have been developed since the 1990s. The early version (SCPM 1; SAS-based) was a regional input-output model to trace all economic impacts, including those of intra-and interregional shipments, usually at a certain level of sectoral and geographical disaggregation. Like most other interindustrial models based upon the transactions flows between intermediate suppliers and end producers, SCPM 1 was demand driven to account for losses primarily via backward and forward linkages between economic sectors. Different from many other inter-industrial models, however, it allocated regional economic impacts to geographic zones such as political boundaries (see Richardson et al. 1993) .
A later version (SCPM 2) was developed using the C programming language in the late 1990s. An obvious enhancement of SCPM 2 was to endogenize traffic flows, which incorporates transportation network model with gravity models to allocate indirect and induced impacts generated by input-output model to the TAZs.
When traffic flows are endogenous, any change in economic activity that affects the travel behavior of individuals or the movement of freight will influence how the transportation network is used, and these impacts will work themselves out as change from one network equilibrium to another. This extension allowed use of the freight database in the regional transportation model. Similar to most traditional travel demand model, the transportation network modeling components in SCPM 2 involved consistent, robust, and practical estimates on traveler's route choices. But this version only involved modeling traffic in the three-hour AM-peak period using static user-equilibrium assignment (see Cho et al. 1999; Gordon et al. 2005 . The model structure for these applications is shown in Figure 2 .
Instead of modeling the three-hour AM peak period as in SCPM 2, the current SCPM 3 inherits all the capabilities of previous versions and adds time-of-day functions to model AM peak, PM peak, and offpeak traffic. SCPM 3 is developed to facilitate an understanding of the actual effects of peak-load pricing on a complex land use-transportation system, including impacts on transportation network performance at the link level and activity effects at the TAZ level. It replaces the network equilibrium model shown in Figure 2 by a newly developed module for user equilibrium with variable demand (UE-VD). In the literature, user equilibrium with variable demand (UE-VD) problems have been discussed for scenarios with trip rates influenced by the level of service on the network, i.e. travelers may change the time of travel to get around traffic congestion. In the variable demand scenarios, the fixed trip rate assumption in user equilibrium algorithm developed for traditional travel demand model is dropped. The trip rate is assumed to be determined by the travel time between origin and destination.
Various demand functions have been proposed and different UE-VD algorithms are developed to find the link flows, the link travel times, and the O-D trip rates under the user equilibrium condition. We adopted the appropriate algorithms for the SCPM model to study the time-of-day effects on travel demand and economic activities.
Based on the algorithms described by Shefi (1985) , the user equilibrium with variable demand model (UE-VD) for time of the day choice is formulated as follows:
where a x is the total flow on link a.
is the cost-flow function to calculate average travel cost on link a. 
We also know the variable travel demand can be expressed by the excess demand through a network representation. We can derive the following formula If we plugged in the inverse demand function (4.9) with given parameters and the link cost-flow function (4.12) into formula (4.11), we get the objective function of the user equilibrium with variable demand model (UE-VD).
The solution algorithm is summarized as follows,
Step 0: Initialization. Perform all-or-nothing approach to assign trips using free flow travel costs ) 0 ( Step 1: Update. The travel time on link a is updated as ) ( a a a x t t  and inverse demand function
is calculated using formula (4.8).
Step 2: Find a feasible descent direction. Use the updated travel time { a t } for an all-or-nothing assignment for the trips. 
, then flows to all the paths would be 0, i.e. path flow 
Step 3: Find optimal parameter. A linear approximation algorithm (LPA) such as Golden section method described in Sheffi (1985, Chapter 4 ) is applied to obtain optimal parameter  satisfying the UE-VD equation: x is changed to be ) (
Step 5: Test Convergence. The process stops when a convergence criterion is satisfied and link flows are the optimal link flows at equilibrium condition. Otherwise, go back to Step 1 and continue the process.
As a replacement of the network equilibrium model shown in Figure 2 , this UE-VD algorithm is applied to three time periods, AM peak, PM peak, and off-peak, to examine the time-of-day effects of two toll scenarios, $0.1 per mile and $0.3 per mile. The delta trips or the excess demands in both AM and PM peak periods, i.e. the difference between the total trips allocated to the peak period using trips-in-motion factors A. LEVELS OF SERVICE AND TOLL REVENUES Table 1 includes a summary of results gleaned from the more detailed findings in Tables 2, and 3 . Most trips involve freeways (tolled during two peak periods in our scenarios) as well as surface streets (not tolled). We focus on changes for the total trip (average and total trip times) as well as changes for the freeway and surface street components. We find that, depending on the scenario, the extent to which drivers used tolled vs. untolled segments, varied substantially. The $0.3 per mile high toll scenario shows high shifts of traffic from peak periods to the off-peak period. The AM peak traffic declines by 8.5 percent and the PM peak traffic declines by 5.17 percent (See Table 2a and 2b), which is in line with the findings in the available literature. For example, Muriello (2003) reported the 5.7 or 9.0 percent reduction of traffic in the peak morning period and 4 percent reduction of traffic volume in the peak evening as a result of the congestion pricing program in the PANYNJ. 25,611,394 288,195,440 11.25 25,502,646 306,922,912 12.03 -0.42% 6.50% 6.95% 25,611,394 288,195,440 11.25 25,627,082 289,364,698 11.29 0.06% 0.41% 0.34%
Assuming that there are 250 days of the year in which congestion tolling occurs, the lower toll ($0.10/mile) transfers substantially more revenue to the tolling authority than would the higher toll ($0.30/mile), $1,420 million vs. $550 million. Table 4 shows that revenue estimates are available for the various counties of the metropolitan area. Our model also makes them available for spatial units below the county (see King, Manville and Shoup 2006) . Note: the total revenue is the daily revenue based on the daily AM-and PM-peak passenger vehicle volume and link length of the tolled lanes.
Overall (24-hour) trip volumes change very little, with a small decrease at the higher toll (-0.42 percent vs.
0.06 percent). The higher toll moves trip volumes from the peaks to the off-peak periods, but the trip volume effects for the lower toll are very minor -and seemingly in the wrong direction. But substitutions from tolled roads to non-tolled roads are a big part of the story. Both tolls cause improvements in average and total freeway travel times, but at the cost of increased travel times on non-tolled surface streets. For the lower toll, this adds up to only minor changes in overall travel times. For the higher toll, aggregate travel times increase as riders try to avoid the toll.
Total and average daily travel time is almost unchanged for the lower toll, but increase somewhat at the higher user fee. The significant changes are, as expected, in the shifts from peak to off-peak. And these shifts are revealed by average and total trip time impacts which are much larger for the higher toll. At the same time, for both tolls, there are substantial shifts from tolled to non-tolled roads in each peak period, more so for the larger toll. Off-peak traffic increases for tolled as well as non-tolled roads for the higher toll, but decreases slightly for both at the lower toll. If we accept the Parry-Small findings (the higher toll), internalizing the externalities has high costs.
The trade-off facing policy makers is complex: internalized externalities vs. improved peak-hour levels-ofservice vs. greater revenues collected. Notably, improved levels of service on tolled freeways comes at the expense of greatly increased use of surface roads.
B. LAND USE EFFECTS
The application of SCPM generates detailed network effects as well as information on changed trip production for each of the region's TAZs. Regional maps showing the latter effects are show in Figures 3a and 3b. Trip production can be thought of as an indicator of development pressures. In this way, we get a hint of how regional development patterns might eventually change. We have already mentioned that most analysts expect that a priced network will bring about higher densities and a less spread out (less "sprawled") metropolitan area. But we have also noted that these suggestions do not reflect the large number of trade-offs that occur in a complex network.
Inspection of the two maps shows that patterns of change are hard to discern of summarize, but one thing does jump out immediately: development pressures shift downward, across-the-board, for the higher fee but they shift upward, across-the-board, for the lower toll. We wondered whether there is any association between TAZ population density and changes in trips produced. The two plots shown in Figures 4a and 4b show that there is no link. This supports our argument that studying an actual network can yield surprising results that may not be available from discussions involving abstract models. Free access to roads and highways is the dominant approach in most of the world's cities. As more and more people reach a level of affluence to enable them to afford an automobile, road congestion spreads.
The various proposals to alleviate the problem (invest in public transit, seek transit-friendly high-density development, narrow roads to discourage auto use, etc.) have their roots in the reluctance to price scarce road space. Our claim is that the political aversion to pricing can be challenged via a better understanding of its consequences. To that end, we have developed a modeling approach to do just that. Tolling all freeways can have negative total travel time effects because they prompt increasing use of surface streets.
Policy makers may want to consider alternatives to full internalization which involve re-thinking the ParrySmall toll estimates.
Finally, we have not explicitly addressed the discussion of privatization (Roth 2006) . But if segments of any highway system are to be auctioned off, both buyers and sellers are better off if informed of the time savings that can be achieved at what level of tolling. Again, these magnitudes are most plausible if estimated from a simulation of traffic and tolls on a network that corresponds to reality and that includes the link or links under consideration.
